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Abstract 
 
For the last two decades, the primary instruments for UK regional policy have been 
discretionary subsidies. Such aid is targeted at “additional” projects - projects that would 
not have been implemented without the subsidy - and the subsidy should be the minimum 
necessary for the project to proceed. Discretionary subsidies are thought to be more 
efficient than automatic subsidies, where many of the aided projects are non-additional 
and all projects receive the same subsidy rate. The present paper builds on Swales (1995) 
and Wren (2007a) to compare three subsidy schemes: an automatic scheme and two types 
of discretionary scheme, one with accurate appraisal and the other with appraisal error. 
These schemes are assessed on their expected welfare impacts. The particular focus is the 
reduction in welfare gain imposed by the interaction of appraisal error and the 
requirements for accountability. This is substantial and difficult to detect with 
conventional evaluation techniques.   
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 1. Introduction 
 
For the last two decades, the primary instruments for UK regional policy have been 
discretionary subsidies. In particular, in 1988 the discretionary Regional Selective 
Assistance (RSA) replaced the automatic Regional Development Grant (RDG) as the 
main systematic aid for industrial regeneration.i For a particular project, the receipt of an 
automatic subsidy depends on that project’s meeting a clear set of easily verified 
conditions. However, a discretionary subsidy is allocated on project criteria that are 
initially private information to the firm.  
 
Two general aspects of discretionary subsidies that certainly apply to RSA are the 
following. First, the subsidy is targeted at “additional” projects: projects that would not 
have been implemented without the subsidy. Second, the subsidy given to additional 
projects is calculated as the minimum necessary for the project to proceed (HM Treasury, 
2003; Scottish Executive, 2006). In this respect, discretionary subsidies are thought to be 
more efficient than automatic subsidies, where many of the aided projects are non-
additional and all projects receive the same subsidy rate.  
 
However, the use of discretionary subsidies raises three fundamental difficulties. 
First, discretionary subsidies have potentially higher administration costs, stemming from 
the need for the government to appraise in detail each project individually. Second, the 
government is likely to make appraisal errors, which reduces the effectiveness of 
discretionary subsidies. Third, discretionary subsidies are inherently less transparent than 
automatic subsidies. Typically the subsidy offered depends on recommendations from 
civil servants, a procedure that is therefore open to potential corruption (Rose-Ackerman, 
1999). In order to counteract this, discretionary schemes must be accountable, but this 
accountability can adversely affect the scheme’s economic efficiency. 
 
The present paper builds on, and extends, the analysis of Swales (1995) and Wren 
(2007a). It compares three subsidy schemes: an automatic scheme; a discretionary 
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scheme with accurate appraisal; and a discretionary scheme with appraisal errors. Of 
particular concern is the impact of appraisal error, in combination with the requirement 
for accountability, on the efficiency of a discretionary subsidy regime. The usual concern 
over appraisal error is the costs imposed by non-additionality. However, the present 
analysis identifies a much more serious concern. This is the loss from the scheme of 
additional projects that fear inaccurate classification and therefore inadequate subsidy.    
  
The paper is organised in the following way. Section 2 outlines the model 
assumptions. Sections 3 and 4 identify the optimal (welfare maximising) automatic 
scheme and discretionary scheme with accurate appraisal. Section 5 gives the impact of 
introducing appraisal error in the operation of the discretionary scheme with 
accountability. Sections 6 compares the three schemes on expected welfare gains. Section 
7 is a short conclusion.   
  
 2. Model assumptions 
 
A standard principal-agent approach is adopted, where the government is the 
principal and the firm the agent. The subsidy regimes have the following characteristics. 
The government subsidises individual projects. These projects have identical total 
financial costs, which are normalised to unity. The output of each project is sold in a 
competitive market where the price per unit is again set at one. However, project 
productivity, ρi, is a random variable drawn from a uniform distribution whose range is 0 
to 1 + r (where r > 0).ii 
 
The firm’s objective function is to maximise profits. If a firm is offered a grant of gi 
on project i, and the firm accepts the grant, the firm must implement the projectiii, where 
the project’s profits, πi, are given by:  
 
(1) 1i i giπ ρ= − +  
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Note that for ease of analysis, the firm’s compliance cost is zero. However, where the 
project is subject to a discretionary subsidy, the firm has to commit a share, β, of the 
project’s cost prior to knowing the level of the subsidy offer.iv For terminological 
convenience, if a firm is made a zero offer but implements the project, the firm is said to 
have accepted the offer.  
 
The government’s objective function is to maximise the expected change in social 
welfare, E(Wi), associated with each project (Drazen, 2000, p.8). Through some market 
failure, the shadow price of the project’s inputs, Δ, (which is identical across all projects) 
is less than their market price: [ )0,1Δ∈ .v This means that without a subsidy some projects 
that would potentially generate positive net welfare will not be implemented. These are 
projects where ( ,1)iρ ∈ Δ . However, operating any subsidy scheme involves transaction 
cost. The obvious elements are the administration cost for the government, which are 
given as k per project, and the proportional resource and distortionary cost, c, involved in 
raising the tax revenues to cover the government’s cost and subsidy payments.vi 
Subsidies also generally have distributional impacts with potential welfare implications, 
but these are abstracted from here.vii 
i
 
For a given project, the welfare change associated with its implementation, Wi, is 
therefore the resource benefit, Bi, minus the transactions cost, Ti: 
(2) i iW B T= −  
If the project accepts the subsidy offer gi:  
(3) i iB ρ= −Δ  
and  
(4) (1 )i iT cg k c= + +  
 
The subsidy schemes are modelled as games involving asymmetric information where 
the precise productivity of the project is initially private information to the firm. In the 
case of an automatic subsidy, the government’s administration costs are taken to be zero 
(k = 0) and a common subsidy is offered across all projects.viii In the discretionary 
 6
subsidy, the government adopts an appraisal process that has a positive administration 
cost, k, and implies a commitment of resources by the firm in order to extract a 
productivity signal, si, for the project. The government then bases the subsidy level on the 
signal. Both the firm and the government are taken to be risk neutral.  
 
3. An optimal automatic scheme 
 
Figure 1a gives an extensive form representation of the automatic subsidy scheme. At 
G the government sets a fixed subsidy level per project, gA, where the A superscript 
indicates an automatic grant. At N a move by nature allocates the firm a project with 
productivity ρi. At F1 the firm can choose to accept or reject the subsidy. If the firm 
accepts, it must carry out the project with a pay-off to the government of (ρi-Δ-cgA) and 
to the firm of (ρi+gA-1).ix If the firm rejects the subsidy at F2 it can then either abandon 
the project, with pay-offs of (0,0), or implement it unaided where the pay-offs are (ρi-Δ, 
ρi-1).  
 
Using backward induction, at F1 with a positive subsidy offer, the firm will never 
reject the scheme and then implement the project. Therefore all projects where: 
(5) 1 0Ai gρ + − ≥  
accept the scheme, implement the project and receive the subsidy. Where the productivity 
lies in the range  the projects are additional. )1 ,1Ai gρ ⎡∈ −⎣
 
With an automatic scheme, the government sets the fixed subsidy level to maximise 
expected welfare. The following general notation is introduced. The lowest productivity 
level for which a firm will choose to enter the subsidy scheme is given as Aρ , so that 
imposing expression (5) as an equality gives: 
(6) 1A Agρ = −  
Using equation (6), the expected net resource benefit, E(NB)A - that is, the resource 
benefit above that which would have occurred without the subsidy scheme - is given as: 
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(7) 
1 (1 )(1 2 )1 (( ) ( )
1 2(1 ) 2(1 )
i
i
A A A A
A
i i
g gE NB d
r r
ρ
ρ ρ
ρ ρρ ρ
=
=
− + − Δ −Δ −= −Δ = =+ +∫ 2(1 ) )r+  
and the expected transaction cost as 
(8) 
1 (1 )1 (( )
1 1
i
i
r A A A A
A A
i
cg r cg r gE T cg d
r r
ρ
ρ ρ
ρρ
= +
=
+ − += = =+ +∫ )1 r+  
 
Equations (7) and (8) express the expected net resource benefit and transaction cost as 
functions of the subsidy level. Reformulating equation (2) to reflect expected net resource 
benefit, it is straightforward to derive the optimal subsidy rate using the first and second 
order conditions. However, for pedagogic reasons, the marginal values of the expected 
net resource benefit and transaction cost of increasing the subsidy rate are determined 
separately. This procedure has two advantages: it allows a diagrammatic exposition and 
eases the welfare comparison of an automatic and discretionary subsidy. 
 
Here, and at various other points in the paper, it is convenient to derive the expected 
outcomes not for an individual project but for projects submitted by a population of (1+r) 
firms, each with one project.x Adopting this procedure and partially differentiating 
equations (7) and (8) with respect to the subsidy rate gives the expected marginal net 
benefit and cost for changes in the level of the automatic subsidy. These will be 
subsequently referred to as the marginal benefit and marginal cost of the subsidy.  
(9) ( )( ) 1
A
A A
A
E NBME NB g
g
∂= = −Δ −∂  
(10) ( )( ) ( 2 )
A
A A
A
E TME T c r g
g
∂= = +∂  
 
The marginal benefit and cost curves are presented in Figure 2. The marginal benefit 
curve has a negative 45° slope and takes the value 1 – Δ where the subsidy is zero. The 
marginal cost comprises fixed and variable elements. The fixed element, cr, corresponds 
to the deadweight spending on non-additional projects.xi The variable element, 2cgA, is 
generated by the requirement to pay increased subsidies to all the additional projects, and 
this accounts for the positive slope. 
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 Setting marginal benefit and cost equal gives the optimal automatic subsidy, , 
as
*Ag
xii:  
(11) * 1
1 2
A crg
c
−Δ −= +  
The corresponding optimal change in welfare is shown as the area of the triangle between 
the marginal benefit and cost curves. It is calculated as: 
(12) 
* 2
* (1 ) (1 ) (1 2 )( )( )
2 2(1 2 ) 2
A A
A cr g cr c gE W
c
−Δ − −Δ − += = =+
* 2
 
 
A number of basic points are clear from inspection of Figure 2. First, with no 
transaction cost, so that c is set to zero, the optimal automatic subsidy is 1 – Δ, reducing 
the subsidised financial cost of inputs to their shadow price. Second, with any increase in 
transaction cost, either through an increase in the cost of public funds, c, or the extent of 
non-additionality, r, the optimal subsidy and additional welfare falls, so that: 
 
* * * *( ) ( ), ,
A A A Ag g E W E W
c r c r
∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ 0<∂ ∂ ∂ ∂  
Third, if the fixed marginal transactional cost of subsidising the non-additional projects, 
cr, is greater than the marginal resource benefit from projects on the verge of 
profitability, 1-Δ, then the optimal strategy is to offer a zero subsidy. 
 
4. A discretionary scheme with accurate appraisal   
 
Consider next a discretionary scheme with no appraisal error. The game is set up as in 
Figure 1b. The government moves first, at G1, by announcing a subsidy schedule that sets 
the non-negative subsidy level for an individual project as a function of the productivity 
signal:  
(13) ( )i ig g s=  
One key element of the accountability of both discretionary schemes analysed in this 
paper is that this announcement must be credible. That is to say, the actual subsidy offer 
must follow this announced schedule.xiii 
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 At N1 there is a move by nature that randomly allocates the firm a project with 
productivity level, ρi, which is private information to the firm. At F1 the firm then decides 
whether to accept or reject the scheme. If the firm rejects the scheme, at node F2 it 
chooses either to implement the project or not. The pay-offs at this point are in principle 
the same as the corresponding pay-offs under the automatic subsidy. However, for 
pedagogic purposes, the pay off to the firm if it implements the project unaided is taken 
to be 1iρ ε− + , where ε  is vanishingly small.xiv  
 
Up to this stage in the game, there is no transaction cost. However, once the firm 
accepts the subsidy scheme, there is an appraisal procedure that costs the government k 
per project and requires the firm to make a resource commitment of β. If the project goes 
ahead, the total cost to the firm is still unity. However, if the project is not implemented 
then the firm looses the committed resources. 
 
In order to compare more easily discretionary schemes with accurate appraisal and 
with appraisal error, the appraisal procedure is identified with a move by nature at N2. 
Here this produces a productivity signal, DAis , where the DA superscript stands for a 
discretionary subsidy with accurate appraisal. The definition of accurate appraisal is that 
the productivity signal equals the actual project productivity, so that: 
(14) DAi is ρ=  
 
At G2 the government makes a non-negative subsidy offer, given generically as 
expression (13), which is determined by the productivity signal and the announcement at 
G1. At F3 the firm can either accept the offer and implement the project, or reject the 
offer. At F3, because the subsidy offer is non-negative, a firm that rejects always 
abandons the project. (Recall that a firm that is made a zero offer and implements the 
project is classified as accepting the offer). The pay-offs if the subsidy is rejected are (- 
(1+c)k- β, - β). Accepting the offer, and therefore being required to undertake the project, 
produces the pay-offs: (ρi -Δ- cgi - (1 + c)k, ρi + gi -1). 
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 To find the optimal subsidy schedule - that is the optimal form of expression (13) - 
first consider the incentive compatibility constraint at F3 (Grossman and Hart, 1983). For 
the firm to accept the subsidy requires: 
(15) 1i igρ β− + ≥ −  
Next, using backward induction at F2, the firm’s participation constraint at F1 is that: 
(16) 1 ( 1 ,0)i i ig Maxρ ρ ε− + ≥ − +  
The government’s initial step in deriving the optimal subsidy schedule is to satisfy the 
firm’s incentive compatibility and participation constraints at minimum cost. 
 
Expression (16) suggests that a separation should be made in the analysis, depending 
on whether the inequality ρi – 1 ≥ 0 holds. Where this inequality does hold, the project 
would be implemented even if unassisted. The government therefore offers a subsidy of 
zero: . 0ig =
 
On the other hand, where ρi  – 1 < 0 for the project to be implemented, a subsidy is 
required. In this case, the lowest cost subsidy consistent with the participation constraint 
is given as: 
(17) 1i ig ρ= −   
This subsidy level is also consistent with the firm’s incentive compatibility constraint 
(equation (15)). Substituting equation (17) into equations (2), (3) and (4) gives the 
government’s “lowest cost” pay-off from subsidising a project whose productivity lies 
within this range as:  
(18) (1 ) (1 )i i iW c k cρ ρ= −Δ − − − +  
 
Imposing the government’s participation constraint (Wi ≥ 0) in equation (18) 
generates the range of productivity values that optimally attract a subsidy as:  
(19) 1
1i
c k
c
ρ Δ +> ≥ ++  
Where the project’s productivity lies in the range lower than that given in equation (19), 
the pay-off to the government is always negative, so that it is optimal for government to 
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offer a subsidy that fails to meet the firm’s participation constraint.xv Again a zero 
subsidy is convenient.  
 
Following these arguments, the optimal form of expression (13) is therefore: 
(20) 
, 1
0
DA DA
i i
i
,iIf s s s g s
else g
> ≥ = −
=  
where  
 1
1
DA DA cs and s k
c
Δ += = ++  
This optimal subsidy scheme has characteristics that are reflected in the rules for RSA. In 
particular, the UK government aims only to subsidise additional projects, so that DAs = 1, 
and the subsidy is the minimum required for the project to be profitable, . The 
determination of 
1ig = − is
DAs  is a more uncertain. RSA applications where the grant is greater 
than £250,000 “ are required to satisfy an explicit test of economic efficiency to ensure 
that the project will confer some net benefit to the UK economy” (Scottish Executive, 
2006, p. 4). Projects where the grant is likely to be greater than £2 million are put through 
an even more detailed efficiency test and, if necessary, a fuller cost benefit appraisal. 
However, there are also imposed aid ceilings for RSA, where the maximum level of aid 
varies across different sub-regions. In Development Areas in Scotland, the maximum 
grant level varies between 10% and 30% of project costs in.  
 
From equations (14) and (17) it is clear that there is a very straightforward mapping 
between the project’s actual productivity, the productivity signal and the subsidy offer. In 
particular, corresponding to the range of productivity signals that will attract a subsidy, 
there is an identical range of project productivities within which the firm will enter the 
subsidy scheme. This range of productivities is again bounded by the minimum and 
maximum values: ),DA DAρ ρ⎡⎣ . Therefore in the accurate appraisal case: 
(21) 
1
DA DA cs k
c
ρ Δ += = ++  
(22) 1DA DAsρ = =  
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with the corresponding optimal minimum and maximum values for the discretionary 
subsidy: 
(23) * *1 , 0
1
DA DAg k g
c
−Δ= − =+  
 
The increase in expected welfare, E(W), from operating the subsidy scheme can be 
decomposed into the expected net resource benefit and transaction cost. 
  
(24) 
11( ) ( )
1
(1 )(1 2 ) (2(1 ) )
2(1 ) 2(1 )
i
DA
i
DA
i i
DA DA DA D
E NB d
r
g g
r r
ρ
ρ ρ ρ ρ
ρ ρ
=
== −Δ+
− + − Δ −Δ −= =+ +
∫
A  
 
 (25)
1
22
1( ) ( (1 ) (1 ))
1
(1 )1 1(1 )(1 ) (1 )
1 2 1 2
i
DA
i
DA
i i
DADA
DA D
E T c k c d
r
c gc
k c k c g
r r
ρ
ρ ρ
ρ ρ
ρ ρ
=
=
= − + ++
A
⎡ ⎤⎡ ⎤⎡ ⎤− ⎣ ⎦⎢ ⎥= + + − = + +⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥+ +⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦
∫
 
 
Again, applying the policy to a population of 1+r projects, differentiating (24) and (25) 
with respect to DAg gives the marginal benefit and cost for changes in the maximum 
subsidy for a discretionary scheme with perfect appraisal.  
 (26) ( )( ) 1
DA
DA D
DA
E NB AME NB g
g
∂= = −Δ∂ −  
 (27) ( )( ) (1 )
DA
DA D
DA
E T AME T k c cg
g
∂= = + +∂  
 
To begin, note that interchanging gA with DAg  in equations (9) and (26) reveals that 
the expected marginal net resource benefit curve under this discretionary subsidy is 
identical to that for the automatic subsidy. Therefore any difference in the operation of 
the two schemes depends solely on the transaction cost. The marginal transaction cost 
curve for the discretionary subsidy again has fixed and variable elements. The fixed 
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element, k(1+c) is the resource and tax cost associated with the appraisal. The variable 
element, DAcg , is the cost of the tax to financial marginal projects. 
 
The relevant marginal benefit and cost curves for the discretionary subsidy with 
accurate appraisal are also shown on Figure 2. The optimal discretionary subsidy is found 
where they intersect. In general, the optimal levels for the maximum discretionary and 
automatic subsidies differ. Algebraically these expressions are given in equations (11) 
and (23). As with the automatic subsidy, that area of Figure 2 between the marginal 
benefit and cost curves represents the welfare gain. This has the value: 
(28) 
* 2
* (1 (1 )) (1 (1 )) (1 )( )
2 2(1 )
DA DA
DA k c g k c c gW
c
−Δ − + −Δ − + += = =+
* 2
2
 
It is clear by inspection that any increase in transaction cost, in this case the appraisal 
cost, k, and the cost of public finance, c, will again reduce the optimal maximum grant 
and the expected welfare change: 
 
* * * *( ) ( ), , ,
DA DA DA DAg g E W E W
c k c k
∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ 0<∂ ∂ ∂ ∂  
 
Further, Figure 2 also indicates that there might be no possibility for a welfare increasing 
discretionary subsidy. This would be where the fixed marginal appraisal cost, k(1+c), is 
greater than the maximum possible marginal net resource gain, 1–Δ.  
 
An examination of Figure 2 shows that there is no a priori reason for believing that 
the discretionary subsidy with perfect appraisal produces higher welfare gains than an 
optimal automatic subsidy. From inspection, cr > k(1+c) is sufficient for the discretionary 
subsidy to have a higher welfare gain, whilst *A Dg g> *A is sufficient for the automatic 
subsidy to have the higher welfare. In general the relative welfare gain depends on the 
trade off between the greater revenue-raising costs associated with the automatic subsidy 
against the potentially greater appraisal costs of the discretionary subsidy. 
 
5. A discretionary scheme with appraisal error   
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 The accurate appraisal scheme has the following important features. First, there is 
perfect separation: no “non-additional” projects apply for the subsidy. Second, all 
additional projects that generate a welfare benefit apply, whilst no additional project 
whose subsidisation would generate a welfare loss applies. Third, firms enjoy no 
information rent: all the benefit from the subsidy scheme goes to the government. Finally, 
all projects that apply are implemented. However, in general, none of the above 
characteristics apply once appraisal error is allowed.   
 
Appraisal error is introduced in the following way. Where a project with productivity 
ρi is being appraised, the productivity signal takes a symmetric, uniform distribution with 
maximum and minimum values of iρ α+  and iρ α− .xvi This distribution is common 
knowledge. The game represented in Figure 1b is adjusted accordingly. The move by 
nature at N2 now generates the productivity signal, DEis , in the random manner as 
described. The superscript DE indicates a discretionary scheme with appraisal error. All 
other elements of the game are as before. 
  
For accountability, the subsidy schedule is given by equation (20). It is identical to 
that used in the accurate appraisal model. In effect, this procedure requires that the 
government treat its own appraisals as accurate. This implies that a project should be 
offered a positive subsidy only where the appraisal suggests that this is appropriate. 
Further, the project should be given the minimum subsidy required for project viability 
given the productivity signal. As argued in the introduction, this reflects existing UK 
practice on the administration of RSA (Scottish Executive, 2006).  
 
Appraisal error combined with accountability has four practical implications. First, 
there is an incentive for some non-additional projects to apply for the assistance scheme 
because there is a possibility that the productivity signal will incorrectly identify the 
project as requiring a subsidy. Second, some additional projects might apply for the 
subsidy and then be made an offer that is insufficient to meet the incentive compatibility 
constraint. This can occur where a project’s productivity has been appraised as greater 
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than its actual level. Third, there might be additional welfare improving projects that no 
longer meet the participation constraint once errors are introduced into the appraisal 
procedure. Finally, because firms can accept those subsidy offers that produce excess 
profits but reject those that produce a loss, generally firms will make positive profits from 
entering the scheme. As will become apparent, expected profits also occur where a 
project’s productivity is close to the upper bound signal, DAs :  that is, close to unity. All 
these changes that accompany appraisal error reduce the efficiency of the discretionary 
subsidy scheme.   
 
The values of two key parameters, expressed relative to the appraisal error, α , 
determine the change in the efficiency of the discretionary scheme that accompanies 
appraisal error. These parameters are the value of the maximum grant, DAg , and the 
firm’s committed cost, β. The nature of these effects can be investigated by first 
considering a situation where the maximum subsidy and the committed costs are large, 
relative to the appraisal error, so that 2
DAg
α ≥  and 1
β
α ≥ . 
xvii 
 
5.1 Relatively small appraisal error: 2, 1
DAg β
α α≥ ≥  
 
Begin with a project whose possible productivity signals all lie within the aided 
range, so that: 
(29) 1 DA Di i is sρ α ρ ρ α= > + > > − ≥ A
i
 
At F3 in Figure 1b the firm accepts the subsidy offer only if the incentive compatibility 
constraint, inequality (15), holds, with the subsidy being determined by equation (20), but 
in this case the signal is equal to: 
(30) i is ρ α= +  
Given that in the case under consideration the signal lies within the range ),DA DAs s⎡⎣ , 
substituting equations (21) and (30) into inequality (15) produces the result that at F3 the 
project will accept the subsidy only if: 
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(31) iβ α≥  
 
The most straightforward situation, and the one that will be the focus of the 
discussion in the text, is where the size of the maximum error is less that the committed 
costs. This is given as:  
(32) 1βα ≥  
The alternative case, where inequality (32) fails to hold, is dealt with in Appendix 1. The 
assumption of relatively high committed costs makes the analysis more tractable. But 
more importantly, when the model is calibrated to stylised facts about the operation of 
UK regional subsidies, the observed outcomes are consistent with a high committed 
costs.  
 
If inequality (32) holds, then for any project that receives a positive subsidy offer, the 
incentive compatibility constraint holds too. For projects that lie within the range given 
by expression (29), the expected profitability of entering the scheme is calculated, using 
equations (1) and (20), as: 
 
(33) 1( ) ( ) 0
2
i i
i i
s
i i is
E s
ρ α
ρ απ ρα
= +
= − ids= − =∫  
 
In this case the expected value of the subsidy just equals the unassisted loss. In this range 
of productivities, the introduction of error into the appraisal process has no impact on the 
expected outcome. The incentive compatibility condition always holds at F3 and the 
participation constraint holds at F1 with expected profit at a minimum value. 
  
However, for projects whose productivity is closer to the lower or upper bound 
signal values, that is, where ),DA DAi s sρ α⎡∈ +⎣  or (1 ,1)iρ α∈ − , the appraisal error does 
adversely affect the subsidy effectiveness. Such projects always meet the incentive 
compatibility constraint but the reduced subsidy range affects the expected profitability of 
entering the scheme and can impact on the participation constraint. 
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 Begin where the project productivity is 1iρ φ= − , where 0 φ α< < . In this instance 
the project productivity is close to the upper bound productivity signal, 1. The expected 
profitability is given by the expressionxviii: 
(34) 
21
1
1 (( ) 1 (1 ) 0
2 4
i
i
s
i i i is
E s dsφ α
α φπ ρ φα α
=
= − −
+= − + − = − + >∫ )  
A project close to the upper bound signal will not get a subsidy offer where the appraisal 
wrongly identifies the project as being non-additional. However, it still receives subsidy 
offers above the minimum required level for viability when the productivity signal is 
below the actual productivity. But for the net impact of the subsidy scheme on the firm’s 
profitability to be zero, the firm would have to pay a penalty when the productivity signal 
is greater than one. Simply giving a project with a non-additional appraisal a zero subsidy 
means that the firm’s expected profitability becomes positive. This is welfare reducing in 
so far as the additional subsidy has to be funded and therefore the cost of raising tax 
revenue is increased. 
 
On the other hand, where the project’s productivity is close to the lower bound 
signal, so that DAi sρ ϕ= + , where ϕ α≤ , expected profitability is adversely affected and 
is therefore always negative.xix The scheme now fails to satisfy the firm’s participation 
constraint at F1. The intuition here is straightforward. Where the lower bound signal, DAs , 
is within the project’s range of possible productivity signals, some of these potential high 
subsidy payments that such a project could attract are ruled out. Hence the participation 
constraint is not met. This implies that for the discretionary scheme with appraisal error 
where 1βα ≥  and 2
DAg
α ≥  the lower bound productivity level where firms will enter the 
scheme is given by: 
(35) DE DAsρ α= +    
 
Finally, any non-additional project that has a positive probability of receiving a 
subsidy will enter the scheme because even if the firm receives a zero subsidy offer at F3, 
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it will accept.xx  This implies that the upper bound productivity level for entering the 
discretionary scheme with appraisal error is: 
(36) 1DEρ α= +  
 
For a non-additional project whose productivity level lies in the range [ )1,1 α+ , the 
probability of receiving a subsidy is1
2
iρ α
α
− + and the expected value of that subsidy 
would be:
2(1 )( )
4
i
iE
ρ απ α
− += .  
 
If 2
DAg
α ≥ , Figure 3 gives the probability that a project with productivity iρ  would 
receive a positive subsidy. This is the product of the probability that a firm with such a 
project would apply and the probability that such a project would receive a positive offer, 
conditional on its applying. Table 1 summarises the results for the accurate appraisal and 
appraisal error discretionary schemes constructed for the parameter values 1βα ≥  and 
2
DAg
α ≥ . This table shows whether a project whose productivity lies within a particular 
band will participate in each discretionary subsidy scheme. It also identifies those 
productivity ranges where the expected subsidy payment adds to the counterfactual level 
of profits. This occurs for additional projects where the expected profits are positive and 
for non-additional projects where the expected subsidy payment is positive.  
 
It is apparent that in this case the introduction of appraisal error moves the range of 
project productivities that meet the firm’s participation constraint, ),DE DEρ ρ⎡⎣ , upwards 
by the value α . This indicates two important sources of inefficiency introduced with 
appraisal error. The first is the additional projects that are lost to the scheme where 
),DA DAi s sρ α⎡∈⎣ + . The second is the additional administration and tax raising costs 
associated with the appraisal and subsidy payments made to non-additional projects 
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where [ )1,1iρ α∈ + . The third source of reduced efficiency associated with appraisal 
error is the tax funding of the positive profits made by projects where (1 ,1)iρ α∈ − .    
 
5.2 Relatively low maximum subsidy: 2, 1
DAg β
α α< ≥  
 
A reduction in the relative size of the maximum grant, so that 2
DAg
α < , slightly 
complicates the analysis. One implication is that a project at the lower bound 
productivity, DEρ , generates a range of productivity signals that includes both the upper 
and lower bound signal constraints. That is to say, a project with the lower bound 
productivity has a positive probability of receiving a zero subsidy offer both because its 
productivity signal might be too low and also because it might be too high. This is 
analysed in Appendix 2. The lower bound productivity level is now given as: 
  
(37) 
2
1
4
DA
DE
gρ α
⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦= −  
 
The probability that a project entering the scheme will receive a positive subsidy is 
also more complex with this more limited range of acceptable subsidy signals. For the 
range of productivity values where the project does not encounter the lower bound signal 
constraint, 1 1 DAi gρ α> ≥ − + , the probability of getting a positive subsidy offer is 
1
2
iα ρ
α
+ − . For projects in the range 1 1DA ig α ρ− + > ≥ − DAg , the probability of a 
positive subsidy is 
2
DAg
α .
xxi The probability of receiving a positive subsidy where 
2
DAg
α> ≥1 is presented in Figure 4.
xxii Again the inefficient loss of potential welfare 
enhancing additional projects is present, together with the appraisal and subsidisation of 
non-additional projects. Also in this case, all subsidised additional projects will have a 
positive expected profitability.  
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 The importance in this model of the relative size of the maximum discretionary grant 
is consistent with empirical work on the impact of RSA by Criscuolo et al. (2007). Their 
most favoured statistical model identifies no statistically significant effect of receipt of 
RSA on firm employment in those UK regions where the Net Grant Equivalent (NGE)  - 
the maximum investment subsidy – is 10%. However, in assisted areas where the NGE is 
20% and above, significant positive effects on employment are consistently found. The 
high proportionate non-additionality and the low values for the probability of receiving a 
positive subsidy offer for additional plants are likely to generate statistically insignificant 
effects.  
 
6. Comparison of the discretionary subsidy with and without appraisal errors. 
 
It is clear from Figures 3 and 4 that introducing appraisal error reduces the efficiency 
of the discretionary subsidy scheme and that the greater the error, the lower the expected 
welfare gain. These welfare losses are calibrated using stylised facts concerning the 
operation of discretionary subsidies. However, it must be emphasised that the results 
should be regarded as indicative orders of magnitude only. 
 
A number of ex post evaluation studies using industrial survey data have attempted to 
determine the degree of non-additionality in discretionary schemes. These studies 
generally produce a value of around 50% (HM Treasury, 1995).xxiii This means that 
amongst projects receiving a positive subsidy, the number of additional projects should 
broadly equal the number of non-additional projects.xxiv The extent of non-additionality 
can be used to fix the relationship between the degree of error, α , the lower bound 
productivity signal, DAs , the lower and upper bound productivity level that meets the 
firm’s participation constraint, DEρ and DAρ , and the expected welfare gain that would 
apply to the corresponding optimal scheme with accurate appraisal, E(W)DA*. The details 
are given in Appendix 3.   
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The number of non-additional aided schemes, DENAN , can be expressed as a function of 
α : 
(38) 
1
1
1 (1 )
2 4
i
i
DE
NA i iN d
ρ α
ρ
αρ α ρα
= +
=
= − +∫ =  
The very low number of non-additional projects relative to the value of α  indicates that 
if the additional aided projects are to be of an equal number, the range for acceptable 
productivity signals must be less than 2α . Using the arguments following equation (37), 
the number of additional aided schemes, DEAN , is given by: 
(39) 
2 1 ( 1)( 1)1
4 2 2 2
DE
A
m m m mN mα ⎡ ⎤⎡ ⎤ + −⎡ ⎤= − + +⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦⎣ ⎦⎣ ⎦
 
where: 
(40) 
DAgm α=  
so that in the case under consideration,  Setting equation (38) equal to equation 
(39) and solving numerically gives a value of m equal to 1.3. From equations (36), (37) 
and (40), the values for 
2 m> ≥1
, ,DE DE Dsρ ρ A  and DAg  are 1 0.42 ,1 ,1 1.30α α α− + −  and 1.30α  
respectively. 
 
These results are sufficient to calculate the standard deadweight loss due the reduced 
range of subsidised additional projects, DEDWR .
xxv Figure 2 shows the welfare benefit of the 
discretionary subsidy scheme with accurate appraisal as the area between the marginal 
benefit and cost curves. With appraisal error, the number of projects that apply is reduced 
by the ratio 0.421 0
1.30
− = .68 . This generates a deadweight loss, relative to the scheme with 
accurate appraisal, equal to the welfare triangle indicated in Figure 5. The proportionate 
reduction is 0.682 = 0.46, so that: 
(41) *0.46DE DDWR W= A  
This implies that in this model the more limited range of subsidised projects associated 
with appraisal error generates a substantial reduction in the welfare gain of almost 50%. 
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Given the value of DAg , equation (28) can be employed to derive the welfare that 
would be generated by a discretionary subsidy with accurate appraisal, *DAW . Using an 
estimate for the administration and distortionary costs of raising taxation, c, of 0.5 (Wren, 
2007a), *DAW . is given as: 
(42)  [ ] [ ]2* 21.30 1 1.27
2
DA cW
α α+= = .   
Using the information on the upper bound productivity value with appraisal error, the 
second potential source of welfare loss relates to the additional tax-raising costs 
associated with financing the non-additional grantsxxvi.  
 
(43) 
1 2
2 *
1
(1 ) 0.03
4 24
i
i
DE D
NAT i i
cR d
ρ α
ρ
αρ α ρα
= +
=
= − + = =∫ AW  
Official evaluations emphasise identifying the expenditures made for non-additional 
projects, with the aim of attempting to reduce the non-additional expenditure. However, 
equation (43) suggests that, in this model at least, the welfare loss on this score is 
relatively low. 
 
The third source of inefficiency is the cost of financing the profits on the additional 
projects. The details of this calculation are also shown in Appendix 3. Its value is given 
as: 
(44) 2 *0.031 0.02DE DAPTR Wα= = A  
Again these additional tax-raising costs are low, relative to the additional welfare that 
would be generated by a discretionary subsidy with accurate appraisal.  
 
The final step is to take into account the additional administration costs generated 
through the need to appraise the non-additional projects. Once more the details of this 
calculation are given in Appendix 3. The loss of welfare as a result of the costs of 
appraising non-additional projects once appraisal error is introduced is given by 
(1 )k cα + . If a value for the appraisal cost, k, is taken of 5% of the maximum grant, the 
appropriate welfare reduction is given as: 
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(45) *0.08DE DNAAR W= E  
Summing these costs indicates that the appraisal errors generate a decline of almost 60% 
in the welfare derived from the discretionary subsidy. The fall mainly comes from the 
reduction in the number of projects that apply. 
  
6.Conclusions 
 
This paper uses a stylised model to compare the efficiency of automatic and 
discretionary government grant schemes. Though abstract, the research is motivated by 
the practical issues that have emerged in the operation of UK regional policy. The 
effectiveness of the schemes has been measured primarily from a welfare (or cost benefit) 
perspective. The key findings are these. 
 
For automatic subsidies and discretionary subsidies with no appraisal error, the 
relative welfare impact depends on a trade-off between the higher administration cost per 
project for discretionary subsidies as against the higher tax raising costs of financing 
grants to non-additional projects with automatic subsidies. 
  
The introduction of appraisal error reduces the effectiveness of the discretionary 
subsidies: calibrating the present model to stylised facts taken from UK ex post industrial 
survey evaluations, the welfare gain from the discretionary scheme is more than halved. 
The main cause for concern over appraisal error is usually the extent of non-additionality. 
However, with the parameter values used here, the additional administrative and tax 
raising welfare costs associated with non-additionality are relatively small. Rather, in this 
model the main welfare loss stems from the restricted number of projects entering the 
scheme because the scheme no longer meets the firm’s participation constraint for lower 
productivity projects. In the model this is linked to the need for accountability in the 
administration of discretionary aid. This source of welfare loss is particularly difficult to 
identify in empirical studies. 
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However, the analysis raises a number of unanswered questions. The first relates to 
the high level of non-additionality identified in empirical, typically industrial survey, 
evaluations. This suggests that the error in the appraisal procedure is high relative to the 
optimal maximum grant. This result has the implication that the number of rejected 
projects (projects that receive a zero subsidy offer) should be very large – greater than the 
number of projects that receive positive grant offers.xxvii  There is no evidence that such a 
large proportion of applicants fail to receive positive assistance. However, the procedure 
for applying for RSA is rather more protracted than implied here and firms are 
recommended to make informal approaches initially to the relevant government 
department. This may be where many projects are turned away. 
 
The second problem is that the implicit high relative appraisal error, and the 
corresponding small range of project productivities over which the firm will enter a 
discretionary scheme, leads to a situation where all firms that apply implement the project 
whether they receive a positive grant offer or not. This contradicts previous evidence on 
the operation of RSA that suggests that some projects that are given a zero grant offer do 
not subsequently implement the project (Allen et al, 1986).  
 
A third issue concerns the potential conflict between economic efficiency and 
accountability that is embedded in the analysis in this paper. These, albeit indicative, 
results suggest that with appraisal error, the range of additional productivity signals that 
the government is prepared to subsidise should be increased above that which would be 
optimal with accurate appraisal. If this is a major source of inefficiency associated with 
inaccurate appraisal, can this be solved through more sophisticated government practice? 
 
Fourth, if appraisal error is negatively related to the appraisal costs, an optimising 
subsidy scheme would also incorporate the optimal level of appraisal activity (Wren, 
2007a). This is an issue not tackled in this paper 
 
Finally at the moment projects only vary in terms of their productivity. However, 
other characteristics of projects might affect the take-up of discretionary subsidies with 
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appraisal error. Examples would be their degree of risk neutrality or the size of the 
proportionate resource commitment. The impact of such additional plant heterogeneity 
should be investigated.  
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APPENDIX 1: The analysis with relatively low committed costs: β α<  
 
This appendix outlines the operation of a discretionary subsidy with appraisal error 
where 1βα < and 2
DAg
α ≥ . Initially consider a project whose productivity, ρi, is such that 
all possible productivity signals lie within the aided range, so that expression (29) of the 
text holds. In this case, for values of αi greater than β, at F3 the firm’s incentive 
compatibility constraint is not met: the subsidy offer is inadequate and the firm will 
reject. In this range, the proportion of projects made an offer that they reject is given as λ, 
where: 
(A1.1) 
2
α βλ α
−=  
Consider next the firm’s participation constraint at F1. The expected profitability E(πi) is: 
(A1.2) 
21 (( ) ( ) 0
2 4
i i
i i
s
i i i is
E s ds
ρ β
ρ α
α βπ ρ βα α
= +
= −
+= − − = − >∫ ) β  
which is always positive. This reflects the fact that the firm does not now accept subsidy 
offers below a certain level and therefore extracts an information rent.  
 
Equations (A1.1) and (A1.2) characterise projects whose productivity lies within the 
range given by expression (29). However, because the firm will reject offers where the 
productivity signal is greater than ρi + β, then equations (A1.1) and (A1.2) actually apply 
to a wider range of project productivities, that is where: 
(A1.3) 1DA Di i is sρ β ρ ρ α= ≥ + > > − ≥ A  
 
Projects whose productivity levels satisfy expression (A1.3) are not affected by the 
discontinuities introduced by the government’s restricted productivity signal range 
),DA DAs s⎡⎣ , imposed for accountability considerations. In productivity ranges closer to 
these upper and lower subsidy bounds, the outcomes generated by the subsidy regime 
differ. This is represented in Figure A1. This figure gives the range of productivities for 
which a firm will apply for the discretionary subsidy with appraisal errors ),DE DEρ ρ⎡⎣ . It 
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also shows for each productivity level within this range the probability that the project 
will be offered a positive subsidy that will meet the firm’s incentive compatibility 
constraint i.e. that the firm will accept. For productivity values outwith the range 
),DA DAs s⎡⎣  the analysis is exactly the same as in the main text.  
 
To determine the lower bound productivity level that just meets the participation 
constraint, DEρ , consider the probability that the project will be offered a subsidy that 
satisfies the incentive compatibility constraint at F3 and the expected value of that offer, 
given the value of DAs . Define DEρ  as DAs γ+ . The value of γ is then determined by 
imposing the participation constraint as an equality:  
(A1.4) 
21 (( ) ( ) 0
2 4
i i
i i
s
i i i is
E s ds
ρ β
ρ γ
γ βπ ρ βα α
= +
= −
+= − − = − =∫ ) β  
which implies that: 
(A1.5) 2γ αβ β= −  
so that: 
(A1.6) 2DE DAsρ αβ β= + −  
 
For the range of productivity values )2 ,DA DAs sαβ β α⎡ + − +⎣  entry into the scheme 
meets the firm’s participation constraint, but the range of productivity signals is restricted 
from below by the minimum signal, DAs . The probability that the firm will receive an 
offer that meets the incentive compatibility constraint where the productivity level lies 
within this range is
2
DA
i sρ β
α
− + which has minimum and maximum values of 
,
2
β α β
α α
⎡ ⎞+ ⎟⎢ ⎟⎣ ⎠
. For projects within this range there are three potential sources of 
inefficiency, as compared to the perfect appraisal case. First, there is a probability that a 
welfare-increasing project will reject the subsidy and not be implemented. Second, this 
rejection occurs at the incentive compatibility stage, so that the resource commitment by 
the firm and the appraisal costs for the government have already been met. Third, the 
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expected profits for the firm from the subsidy scheme are positive, so that the average 
cost per project of government finance is increased. 
  
In the range of productivities ),1DAs α β⎡ + −⎣  expression (A1.4) holds and the 
probability of receiving an acceptable positive offer is 
2
α β
α
− . The sources of welfare 
loss are again the lower implementation level of welfare-improving projects, the 
resources committed to the appraisal procedure by both firms and government for the 
projects that fail to meet the incentive compatibility constraint, and the funding of the 
higher expected profits. 
 
Finally projects whose productivities lie in range [ )1 ,1β−  have characteristics which 
match the high committed cost case analysed in the text. Projects with productivities in 
this range will always satisfy the incentive compatibility constraint at F3. Even if the 
project is given a zero subsidy, the loss from implementing the project is less than the 
loss from abandoning it, given that a proportion of the costs, β, are already committed. 
The key issue is therefore whether the project passes the participation constraint at F1. 
Given that all projects in this range will be implemented, the expected profitability is: 
(A1.7) 
21 ( 1 )1( ) 1 (1 ) 1 0
2 4
i
i i
s i
i i i i is
E s dsρ α
α ρπ ρ ρα α
=
= −
+ −= − + − = − + >∫  
where 
 
2
2
( ) ( ), 0i i
i i
E Eπ π
ρ ρ
∂ ∂ >∂ ∂  
This means that all projects in this range will apply for the subsidy scheme and all will be 
implemented. The only source of inefficiency for these projects, as compared to the 
accurate appraisal scheme, is the tax raising cost required to finance the additional profits. 
Although the expected profitability of projects increases as the productivity approaches 
unity, the probability of getting a positive subsidy offer falls. This is the probability that 
the signal lies within the range [ ),1iρ α−  and is given as1 2 i
ρ α
α
− + . 
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APPENDIX 2: The lower bound productivity where 2
DAg
α <    
 
Express this productivity in terms of two parameters 1 2,γ γ , where: 
(A2.1) 1 21
DE DAsρ γ= + = −γ  
with 1 2, 0α γ γ≥ ≥ . At DEρ , the firm’s expected profitability from entering the scheme 
equals zero. At F3 the incentive compatibility constraint is always met. This means that 
the expected grant value just equals the unsubsidised loss, so that: 
(A2.2) ( )2
1
2
1 2
2 2
1( ) (1 ) 0
2 4
i i
i i
s
i i is
E s ds
ρ γ
ρ γ
γ γπ γα α
= +
= −
+= − − = − =∫ γ   
Rearranging equation (A2.2) produces: 
(A2.3) 1 2 22γ γ α+ = γ   
If : 
(A2.4) 2
DAngγ =  
and given that from (A2.1): 
(A2.5) 1 2
DAgγ γ+ =  
then equation (A2.3) produces: 
(A2.6) 
4
DAgn α=  
Substituting expression (A2.6) into (A2.4) and then into equation (A2.1) gives the value 
for the lower bound productivity: 
 
(A2.7) 
2
1
4
DA
DE
gρ α
⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦= −  
which is equation (37) in the text.  
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APPENDIX 3: Calculating the welfare loss from appraisal error  
 
A3.1 Determining DEAN  
 
Using the arguments following equation (37), the value of additional aided schemes, 
DE
AN , is given by: 
(A3.1) 
2
1 1 (
1 ( 1)
1
4
1 (1 )
2 2
i i
i
i
m
DE
A i i
m m
mN d
ρ ρ α
ρ α αρ
1)
idρ α ρ ρα
= = −
= − − = −
⎡ ⎤⎢ ⎥= − + +⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
∫ ∫
−
 
which gives equation (39) in the text. 
  
A3.2 Determining DEAPTR  
 
The cost of financing the profits on the additional projects is calculated as: 
(A3.2)
2 2
1 1 ( 1) 12
2
1 ( 1)
1 1
4 4
1 (1 ) (1 )
4 4
i i i
i
i i
m
DE
APT i i i i i
m m m
mR c d d d
ρ ρ α ρ
ρ α α αρ ρ
αρ α ρ ρ ρ ρα
= = − − =
= − − = − = −
⎡ ⎤⎢ ⎥= − + + − −⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
∫ ∫ ∫  
generating the expression: 
(A3.3) [ ] 2
2
1 13 22
1 ( 1)
1
1 ( 1) 14
4
(1 ) (1 )
12 4 2
i i
i
i
i i
mDE i i
APT i m
mm
mR c
ρ ρ
ρ α
αρ αρ α ρ
ρ α ρα ρα
= =
= − −
= −= − − = −
⎡ ⎤⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤− + −⎢ ⎥= − + − −⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦⎣ ⎦
 
 
which gives the result that: 
(A3.4) 
23 2 2 2
2 1 11
12 4 4 2 4
DE
APT
m m m mR c mα ⎡ ⎤⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤−= + − + −⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦⎣ ⎦
 
 
Given the values c = 0.5 and m = 1.3: 
 
(A3.5)  2 *0.031 0.02DE DAPTR Wα= = A  
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 This result is given as equation (44) in the text.  
 
A3.3 Determining DENAAR   
 
The loss of welfare as a result of the costs of appraising non-additional projects once 
appraisal error is introduced equals (1 )k cα + . From equation (42) the proportionate 
reduction in welfare, DENAAR , is given as:  
(A3.6) 2(1 ) 3
(1 (1 ) )1.3 1.3( 1.5)
DE
NAA
c kR
c k q
α
α
+= =−Δ − + −  
where q is the ratio of the maximum resource gain per project to the appraisal cost, so 
that: 
(A3.7)  1q
k
−Δ=   
 
It is not straightforward to fix a value for q. Again stylised facts are used, but to 
restate the earlier warning: the results should be treated as indicative, rather than 
definitive. For the UK, the maximum subsidy under the RSA scheme equals 30% of the 
capital costs (Scottish Executive, 2006). Given that capital costs typically are around 30% 
of value added this represents a grant of around 10% of the value of the project. This 
would imply that the value of 0.1DAg = . Substituting in this value to equation (23), 
which determines the value of DAg  from the underlying parameters, and rearranging 
gives: 
(A3.8) 0.15 1.5q
k
= +  
Substituting (A3.8) back into (A3.6) and using equation (42) gives equation (45) in the 
text.
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Table 1: Participation in a discretionary subsidy scheme and the expected profitability of 
the subsidy payment under accurate appraisal and appraisal error for the parameter values 
1βα ≥  and 2
DAg
α ≥ . 
 
Appraisal  Project Productivity 
Range Accurate Error 
0, DAs⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦  ? ? 
,DA DAs s α⎡ ⎤+⎣ ⎦  0 ? 
,1DAs α α⎡ ⎤+ −⎣ ⎦  0 0 
[ ]1 ,1α−  0 ? 
[ )1,1 α+  ? ? 
[ )1 ,1 rα+ +  ? ? 
 
Note: ? represents no participation, 0 participation with a zero profit implication for the 
firm, and ? participation with an expected positive profitability.
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Figure 1a:  An automatic subsidy scheme  
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Figure 1b: A discretionary subsidy scheme with accurate appraisal and appraisal error. 
abandon project implement project 
(0,0)
  
( , 1 )i iρ − ρ εΔ − +  F2 
announce 
scheme 
g g= ( )i is  
set iρ    
reject scheme 
accept 
scheme 
   set ( )DEi is s ρ=  set  ig accept  offer 
( (1 ) , )c k β β− + − −  
reject offer 
( (1 ) ,
1)
i i
i i
cg c k
g
ρ
ρ
−Δ − − +
+ −  
F1 N2 N1 G1 G2 F3 
accurate appraisal 
set DAi is = ρ  
appraisal error 
Figure 2: Marginal Net Resource Benefits and Transactions Costs to Automatic and Discretionary 
Subsidies 
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( )
Z
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ME NB
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1−Δ  
(1 )k c+  
cr  
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Figure 3: Probability of a positive offer for a discretionary subsidy with appraisal 
error with relatively high committed costs and an unconstrained productivity range, 
1βα ≥  and 2
DAg
α ≥ . 
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Figure 4: Probability of a positive offer for a discretionary subsidy with relatively high committed 
costs and a constrained productivity range 1βα ≥  and 1 2
DAg
α≤ < . 
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2
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Figure 5: Deadweight Loss from Appraisal Error  
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Figure A1: Probability of a positive acceptable offer for a discretionary subsidy 
with relatively low committed costs and an unconstrained productivity range 1βα <  and 
2
DAg
α ≥ . 
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Footnotes 
 
i In general UK regional policy has moved towards a more disaggregated and 
decentralised system, shifting away from automatic subsidies to discretionary support. 
See, for example, the adoption by the post-1997 Labour Government of the Regional 
Development Agencies as central institutions in regional policy delivery (McVittie and 
Swales, 2007). At the time of writing, Regional Selective Assistance still applies in 
Scotland. The comparable scheme in England has been renamed Selective Finance for 
Industry in England (SFIE). 
 
ii Essentially firms are assumed to be in atomistic competition (Viner, 1932) and it is 
convenient to consider these domestic firms as operating in a large, perfectly competitive 
international market. For an alternative approach, see Holden and Swales (1995). For 
pedagogic reasons, issues such as displacement and multiplier effects (Gillespie, et al, 
2001; HM Treasury, 2003, Wren, 2007b) are not considered here, but these could be 
incorporated in a straightforward manner.    
 
iii Fraudulent behaviour, where the firm receives a grant for a project that is never 
implemented, is ruled out. 
  
iv The implication is that in making an application for a discretionary subsidy the firm has 
to gather information that would be required anyway if the project goes ahead but has no 
value if it does not. 
  
v An identical analysis applies if the market failure is in the product market. An example 
would be where each project jointly produces a private and public good (Wren, 2007a). 
  
vi The application of this approach in the UK is slightly problematic. The UK 
government’s guide to public sector appraisal and evaluation procedures, the Green 
Book, recommends a zero cost of raising taxation (HM Treasury, 2003). This is at 
variance to HM Treasury’s concern over exchequer cost per job for regeneration projects. 
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Moreover, with the assumptions made in this paper, assigning zero cost to public funds 
would mean that the automatic subsidy would always out-perform the discretionary 
subsidy using the welfare criterion.   
 
vii Again this assumption is made for ease of analysis. Differential income weights might 
be one of the key reasons for regional subsidies (Evans et al, 2005; HM Treasury, 2003, 
Annex 5). Also distributional issues will be relevant for income transfers to non-
nationals, such as the shareholders of foreign owned companies.  
  
viii The discretionary and automatic schemes broadly correspond to Regional Selective 
Assistance and Regional Development Grants that have operated as elements of UK 
regional policy (Armstrong and Taylor, 2000). Wren (2007a) also considers a hybrid case 
“Proof of Need” scheme where the government adopts a relatively costly monitoring 
process but then offers a subsidy either of zero or of a fixed level. 
  
ix The standard convention is adopted of listing the pay off to the first player (here the 
government) first. 
 
x There is not a problem in moving between considering the game as a single encounter 
between a firm and the government, or as a repeated game where the government plays 
sequentially against a population of firms. In fact, credibility problems are likely to be 
reduced in the repeated game setting. 
  
xi Excess expenditure is known as deadweight in the evaluation literature (HM Treasury, 
2003). However, this should not be confused with the conventional welfare economics 
notion of deadweight loss (Layard and Glaister, 1994). 
 
xii Given that 
2
2 0( )
A
A
NB
g
∂ <∂  and 
2
2 0( )
A
A
T
g
∂ >∂ , the second order conditions for a maximum 
always hold. 
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xiii This commitment is required because of the moral hazard problem that the government 
always has an incentive to pay less than the full subsidy, once the firm has committed 
resources to the project. Without the government being able to commit to the subsidy 
schedule, no project would enter a scheme with accurate appraisal.     
 
xiv The term ε  can be interpreted as a small pay-off for being independent. It is 
introduced so that projects which are just profitable unaided, so that 1iρ = , will chose not 
to enter the scheme, rather than enter the scheme and be given a zero pay-off.  
 
xv  This is in the range 0
1i
c k
c
ρ Δ +≤ < ++ . 
 
xvi For an alternative treatment see Wren (2007a). 
 
xvii  In the text results are given only for the case where 1βα ≥ . The arguments for this are 
given later in Section 5.1.  
 
xviii The term in equation (34) can be shown to be positive because ( ) 0iE πφ
∂ <∂
, ( ) 0iE
and where 
φ α π= =
1 i
. 
 
xix Where β ρ≥ − , so that the project always is implemented,  
 
1 ( )( ) 1 (1 ) 1 0
2 2 2
i i
i i
s
i i i i is
E s ds
ρ α
ρ ϕ
α ϕ α ϕπ ρ ρα α
= +
= −
− +⎡ ⎤= − + − = − − <⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦∫
1i
 
and where β ρ< − , so that the project is not implemented where a zero subsidy is 
offered, 
( )( 1) ( ) 1 ( )( ) (1 ) 0
2 2 2 2
i i
i i
si
i i is
E s ds
ρ α
ρ ϕ
α ϕ ρ α ϕ β α ϕ α ϕπ βα α α
= +
= −
+ − − − − +⎡ ⎤= + − = − − <⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦∫  
 
xx In this model the introduction of appraisal error necessarily implies that non-additional 
projects will enter the discretionary scheme, with a positive probability of receiving a 
positive grant offer. This result is in contrast to Wren (2007a, p. 21) where in a similar 
“Minimum Grant” scheme “a separation by type (“additional” and “non-additional”) is 
 47
                                                                                                                                                                             
always feasible”. The result in Wren (2007a) relies on three key assumptions. First, the 
firm faces an application cost, rather than a resource commitment as in the present paper. 
Second, if the project is deemed additional, an extra payment to cover the application cost 
is incorporated into the grant offer. Third, the distribution of productivity signals is 
discontinuous.  
  
xxi This behaviour is very similar to that given for the operation of the subsidy where 
β α< i for relatively high values of ρ   
 
xxii Where 1
DAg
α> , the highest productivity level at which the probability of getting a 
positive subsidy offer is maximised is greater than 1.  
 
xxiii Hart et al (2008, p. 107) gives figures from the four UK government sponsored ex 
post evaluations of RSA: their own, King (1990), PA Cambridge Economic Consultants 
(1993) and Arup Economics and Planning (2000). In practice the issue of additionality is 
not clear cut. For example, whilst in some cases the project would have gone ahead 
anyway, receipt of RSA could have influenced the scale of the project or the speed with 
which it has been implemented. However, the proportion of aided projects that were fully 
additional varies between 14% and 35% in these studies.   
 
xxiv The degree of additionality has been measured here in terms of the number of 
projects. Were the interpretation the level of grant expenditure, the range of aided 
additional productivities would be even more restricted.  
 
xxv The subscripts DW, NAT, PT and NAA stand for: (conventional welfare economics) 
deadweight loss; tax raising costs of non-additional projects; the cost of funding the 
positive profits from aided firms; and the administrative and appraisal costs of non-
additional projects, respectively.  
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xxvi As with subsequent welfare calculations, the comparison with the accurate appraisal 
case uses equation (42). 
 
xxvii Using the approach adopted in Section 6 to calibrate the UK RSA programme, of all 
the projects that apply, around 30% will receive a positive grant and around the same 
proportion are additional projects that receive a zero grant offer but actually are 
implemented.  
